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A minimal model for tag-based cooperation
Arne Traulsen∗ and Heinz Georg Schuster
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Christian-Albrechts Universita¨t, Olshausenstraße 40, 24098 Kiel, Germany
(Dated: August 29, 2018)
Recently, Riolo et al. [R. L. Riolo et al., Nature 414, 441 (2001)] showed by computer simulations
that cooperation can arise without reciprocity when agents donate only to partners who are suffi-
ciently similar to themselves. One striking outcome of their simulations was the observation that
the number of tolerant agents that support a wide range of players was not constant in time, but
showed characteristic fluctuations. The cause and robustness of these tides of tolerance remained
to be explored. Here we clarify the situation by solving a minimal version of the model of Riolo et
al. It allows us to identify a net surplus of random changes from intolerant to tolerant agents as a
necessary mechanism that produces these oscillations of tolerance which segregate different agents in
time. This provides a new mechanism for maintaining different agents, i.e. for creating biodiversity.
In our model the transition to the oscillating state is caused by a saddle node bifurcation. The
frequency of the oscillations increases linearly with the transition rate from tolerant to intolerant
agents.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of cooperation in evolving populations
with exploitative individuals is still a challenging prob-
lem in biological and social sciences. Most theories that
explain cooperation are based on direct reciprocity, as
the famous iterated prisoner’s dilemma [1]. Cooperation
can also arise from indirect reciprocity when agents help
others only if these are known as sufficiently altruistic
[2]. In most of these models a finite population of agents
is simulated, pairs of agents meet randomly as poten-
tial donator and receiver. A donation involves some cost
to the donor while it provides a larger benefit to the re-
ceiver. Agents reproduce depending on their payoffs after
a certain number of such meetings. Obviously selfish in-
dividuals that do not donate would quickly spread in the
population if help is not channeled towards more cooper-
ative players. If agents do not meet repeatedly—as in a
large population—direct reciprocity does not work. Indi-
rect reciprocity can solve this problems when donations
are given only to those individuals that are known as
sufficiently helpful. This mechanism effectively protects
a cooperative population against exploiters [2].
Riolo et al. [3] introduced a model in which coopera-
tion is not based on reciprocity, but on similarity. In this
model donations are channeled towards individuals that
are sufficiently similar to the donator. To distinguish be-
tween different groups of individuals every agent i has
a tag τi ∈ [0, 1]. School ties, club memberships, tribal
costumes or religious creeds are all tags that induce co-
operation. In addition agents have a tolerance threshold
Ti ≥ 0, which determines the tag interval that the agent
classifies as its own group. An agent i donates to another
∗Electronic address: traulsen@theo-physik.uni-kiel.de
agent j if their tags are sufficiently similar, |τi− τj | ≤ Ti.
The cost of such a donation for i is c > 0 while the benefit
for j is b > c. For simplicity, b is normalized to 1, since
a multiplication of payoffs with a constant factor does
not change the game. Initially, the tag and the tolerance
threshold are uniformly distributed random numbers. In
each generation every agent acts as a potential donor for
P other agents chosen at random. Hence it is on average
also chosen P times as a recipient. After each generation
each agent i compares its payoff with the payoff of an-
other randomly chosen agent j and adopts Tj and τj if j
has a higher payoff. In addition every agent is subject to
mutation. With probability 0.1 an agent receives a new
τ drawn from a uniform distribution and also with prob-
ability 0.1 a new T which is Gaussian distributed with
standard deviation σ = 0.01 around the old T . If this new
T becomes smaller than zero it is set to 0. Obviously, it
seems to be the best strategy for an individual to donate
as little as possible, i.e. to have a very small T . However,
the whole population would be better off if everybody
would cooperate. This “tragedy of the commons” can be
solved in different ways, e.g. by volunteering [4, 5, 6].
Riolo et al. solve this problem by channeling help to-
wards others that are sufficiently similar to the dona-
tor. Instead of a cooperative population the formation
and decay of cooperative clusters is observed for certain
parameter ranges (high P and low c, see Fig. 1). The
average tolerance of a cooperative cluster grows slowly
over time. Occasionally it declines sharply. This decline
occurs when the cluster is exploited by agents that are
sufficiently similar to the cluster’s agents to get support,
but do not help themselves. However, the mechanism
that generates these tides of tolerance remained unclear
[7].
Here we develop a minimal model for tag-based coop-
eration that displays these “tides of tolerance” if there is
a net average drift towards more cooperation. We find
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FIG. 1: Population dynamics for the first 500 generation of
the model of Riolo et al. [3]. The average tolerance and the
donationrate—i.e. the fraction of encounters that lead to a
donation—show fluctuations. When a cooperative cluster be-
comes dominant its tolerance increases until the cluster be-
comes extinct. (c = 0.1, b = 1.0, P = 3).
that these fluctuations vanish if such a drift is not in-
cluded in the model. The importance of this observation
stems from the fact that if we have species that can dis-
tinguish between themselves and others and donate only
to others with the same tag, then this would in the long
run lead to a single group of cooperating species having a
single tag. But if we introduce a small rate of biased con-
versions from intolerant to tolerant species we observe a
waxing and waning in time of species with different tags.
In other words, the small conversion rate leads to a coex-
istence of different species where different species appear
cyclically at different times. This consitutes a new mech-
anism that generates biodiversity in a group of competing
species.
This paper is organized as follows. First the model
of Riolo et al. is simplified in order to allow an analyt-
ical treatment. Then the system without the effects of
mutations is analyzed. Thereafter we introduce a drift
that increases the tolerance and leads to oscillations of
tolerance. We show that the truncated mutations in the
model of Riolo et al. also lead to such a drift.
II. SIMPLIFIED REPLICATOR MODEL
A. Definition of the model
Here we simplify the model of Riolo et al. [3] in order
to allow for an analytical treatment. In a first step we re-
strict the game to only two tags, red and blue. Similarly
we allow only two tolerances. The agents can either only
donate to others bearing the same tag if they have zero
tolerance T = 0 or to every other agent (T = 1). This
leads to four possible strategies. Then we allow partners
to donate and to receive in an single interaction instead
of defining different roles for donators and receivers. We
end up with the payoff matrix
(tag, T ) (red, 1) (blue, 1) (red, 0) (blue, 0)
(red, 1) b-c b-c b-c -c
(blue, 1) b-c b-c -c b-c
(red, 0) b-c b b-c 0
(blue, 0) b b-c 0 b-c
.
The strategies with T = 1 are obviously dominated by
the strategies with T = 0, because the payoff of an in-
tolerant player is always larger than the payoff of the
corresponding tolerant player. There are pure Nash equi-
libria for the intolerant strategies (red, 0) and (blue, 0).
In addition there is an evolutionary instable mixed Nash
equilibrium if these two strategies are used with proba-
bility 12 .
If the intolerant agents do not even cooperate within
their own group we recover the prisoners dilemma [8], see
Appendix A.
Instead of simulating a finite group of agents we calcu-
late only the evolution of the probability that an agent
uses a certain strategy. In the following, p1 and p2
are the frequencies of tolerant red and tolerant blue
agents, respectively. p3 and p4 are the frequencies of
the corresponding red and blue intolerant agents. As
pt1 + p
t
2 + p
t
3 + p
t
4 = 1 the state of the system is com-
pletely determined by pt = (pt1, p
t
2, p
t
3). The trajectory
can therefore be visualized as a trajectory in the three
dimensional simplex shown in Fig. 2.
In order to apply standard replicator dynamics [9] we
calculate the mean payoffs from the payoff matrix as
Πt1 = (b − c)(pt1 + pt2 + pt3)− c pt4
Πt2 = (b − c)(pt1 + pt2 + pt4)− c pt3
Πt3 = (b − c)(pt1 + pt3) + b pt2 (1)
Πt4 = (b − c)(pt2 + pt4) + b pt1
〈Π〉t =
4∑
i=1
ptiΠ
t
i,
where Πi is the payoff of the strategy with frequency pi.
With (1) the replicator equations can be written as
pt+1i = p
t
i + p
t
i β
(
Πti − 〈Π〉t
)
, (2)
where i = 1, .., 4. Here β determines the time scale. In
the following we set β = 1. Our main interest is the
attractors of the system, and a modification of β would
only modify the velocities on the attractor.
B. Fixed points and separatrix
The dynamics of the system (2) can roughly be char-
acterized as follows, see Fig. 2. Most initial conditions
2
lead to fixed points where only one tag survives. The fre-
quency of intolerant players is typically higher than the
frequency of tolerant players here. There is a separatrix
that divides the basins of attraction of the two tags. On
one side of the separatrix red players will survive and on
the other side blue players. In addition we find several
fixed points on the edges described in the following.
PSfrag replacements
p1
p2
p3
p4
pn
pT+
pred
pblue
FIG. 2: The trajectories of the replicator dynamics move from
the inside of the simplex onto the boundaries. The corners
represent the pure strategies pi. Arrows indicate the stabil-
ity of the fixed points at the edges. There are two stable
attractors called pred and pblue (dark grey) corresponding to
stable lines of fixed points of (2). At the top only players
with red tags survive whereas at the bottom where only play-
ers with blue tags can exist. The two basins of attractions of
these stable attractors are separated by a planar separatrix
given by (3). This separatrix is the basin of attraction for the
fixed point in the Nash equilibrium indicated by a black circle
(c = 0.4, b = 1.0).
As in any replicator system the mixed Nash equilib-
rium pn = (0, 0, 12 ) is a fixed point. Here the basin of
attraction is the separatrix. The separatrix shown in
Fig. 2 can be calculated from the stability of this fixed
point, which is discussed for a more general case in Ap-
pendix B. pn is always part of the separatrix, its normal
corresponds to the eigenvector e3 = (1 − c, 1 + c, 2) of
the corresponding Jacobi matrix Jn with the eigenvalue
λ3 =
3−c
2 > 1. We find the equation
ps3 =
1
2
[1− (1− c)ps1 − (1 + c)ps2] (3)
for points on the separatrix. As we have(
p
t+1(ps1, p
s
2, p
s
3)− pt(ps1, ps2, ps3)
) · e3 = 0 the system
never leaves this plane again.
In addition there are two fixed lines if only one tag
is present: pred = (1 − x, 0, x) and pblue = (0, 1 − x, 0)
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 is the fraction of intolerant players.
The stability of the fixed points on these lines depends
on x. For 1−x > c the points are instable and intolerant
players with the opposite tag can invade (see Appendix
B). Finally, there is an instable fixed line for a completely
tolerant population, pT+ = (1−y, y, 0), where 0 ≤ y ≤ 1.
The stability of this fixed line is discussed in Appendix
B.
So far the system does not show any oscillation. It sim-
ply relaxes to one of the fixed points described above. In
the next section a mechanism that generates oscillations
will be discussed.
III. INTRODUCTION OF A BIASED DRIFT
In order to generate oscillations in the system we have
to destabilize the attracting fixed points and force the
system through the separatrix. This can be realized by
introducing first ad hoc a drift that increases the fraction
of tolerant agents at the cost of the intolerant fraction of
the same tag. If we introduce such biased conversions
into our model equation (2) becomes
pt+11 = p
t
1 + p
t
1
(
Πt1 − 〈Πt〉
)
+ εpt3 (4)
pt+12 = p
t
2 + p
t
2
(
Πt2 − 〈Πt〉
)
+ ε
(
1− pt1 − pt2 − pt3
)
pt+13 = p
t
3 + p
t
3
(
Πt3 − 〈Πt〉
)− εpt3.
The solution of these equations shown in Fig. 4 and Fig.
5 display oscillations in tolerance. These oscillations can
be considered as the deterministic equivalent to the tides
of tolerance in [3].
In the model of Riolo et al. [3] such a drift is gen-
erated by truncated mutations. The average tolerance
is usually of the order of σ Therefore the truncation of
negative tolerances decreases the probability for muta-
tions that lower the tolerance and leads to a drift towards
higher tolerances. We repeated the simulations of Riolo
et al. and found that 50.0% of the tolerance mutations
increase T while only 39.8% decrease T. The average mu-
tation increases T by 1.3 · 10−4 (c = 0.1, P = 3, average
over 10 000 realizations with 30 000 generations each).
If we omit the tolerance mutations in the model of Ri-
olo et al. one (low) tolerance is quickly inherited by the
whole populations, see Fig. 3. The majority of players
belongs to a dominant cluster. The mean tag of this
cluster—and hence the donationrate—drifts slowly due
to mutations of the tags. Without mutations of the tags
one tag is inherited by the whole population after a short
initial period. Consequently the donation rate becomes
100%, and tolerance mutations do no longer influence the
system.
A. Qualitative behavior
The attractor of the system (4) is shown in Fig. 4,
and the time evolution of the strategies can be seen in
Fig. 5. If initially all strategies are present the system
shows periodic oscillations for small ε and c = 0.1. One
3
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FIG. 3: Population dynamics for the first 200 generation of
the model of Riolo et al. [3] without tolerance mutations (left)
and without tag mutations (right). Without tolerance muta-
tions the donation rate fluctuates due to tag mutations. All
players inherit the same tolerance after less than 100 genera-
tions. Without tag mutations the donation rate quickly raises
to 100% when all players have the same tag. The fluctuat-
ing tolerance does no longer influence the system (c = 0.1,
b = 1.0, P = 3).
tag becomes dominant. The fraction of tolerant players
increases due to the biased conversions imposed by ε > 0
and intolerant players with the opposite tag can invade
and destroy the cluster, giving rise to a new dominant
cluster with the opposite tag. This attractor shown in
Fig. 4 has essentially the whole simplex as a basin of at-
traction. Only for very small or very high values of c
other fixed points become stable. The system can be an-
alyzed in two parts for ε ≪ 1. Near the edges pred and
p
blue the replicator dynamics becomes irrelevant and the
system is mainly driven by biased conversions. Further
away from these edges the system is driven by the repli-
cator dynamics. Here the dynamics is not altered by the
biased conversions.
Our biased conversions lead the system from an edge
that is dominated by one color to an edge that is domi-
nated by the other color. For small c the trajectory leaves
these edges near the corners of the pure tolerant strate-
gies, cf. Fig. 4. However, these corners are never crossed
as they are fixed points.
B. Fixed points
Let us now analyze the system (4) in more detail. The
fixed line pT+ = (1− y, y, 0) of (2) is still a fixed line of
(4). For c < 2 ε a fraction of the fixed line remains stable,
see Appendix B for details. However, as we are interested
in ε≪ 1 the fixed line is usually instable. Due to the flow
from intolerant to tolerant players the edges pred and
p
blue are no longer fixed. The fixed point pn = (0, 0, 12 )
in the mixed Nash equilibrium moves away from the edge
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FIG. 4: Attractor of the system (4) for c = 0.1. The black
line is the attractor, the grey points are the fixed points. The
plane is the separatrix for ε = 0. The arrows indicate how
the biased conversions drive the system through the separatrix
to the corner with only tolerant individuals. Here individuals
with the other tag can invade and steer the system to a corner
with mostly intolerant individuals. Biased conversions lead
to a tolerant corner again and the circle continues (ε = 0.01,
c = 0.1, b = 1.0).
for ε > 0 and is now given by pd = (ε/c, ε/c, 12 − ε/c).
The stability of this fixed point is discussed in Appendix
B.
In addition we find two more fixed points ps+ and
p
s−. For ε = 0 they correspond to the points where the
population with only one tag loses stability. These fixed
points can be calculated analytically, see Appendix C for
details. The expansion for ε≪ 1 of ps+ is
p
s+ ≈


1− c− 2 ε
c
+ ε
2
(c−1) c2
ε2
c2−c3
c+ (1−2 c) ε
c−c2 − ε
2
(c−1)2 c

 . (5)
Due to the symmetry in the tags ps− can easily be cal-
culated by exchanging p1 with p2 and p3 with p4 =
1 − p1 − p2 − p3. As described above we find ps+ =
(1 − c, 0, c) for ε = 0. Increasing ε moves it towards pd.
For ε = c(1− c)/4 ps± and pd collapse, here pd becomes
stable.
For c < 0.73 we have no fixed points that are stable in
all directions. The whole simplex is essentially the basin
of attraction of the attractor shown in Fig. 4.
C. Bifurcation at ε = 0
The transition from the system without biased conver-
sions, i.e. ε = 0, to the system with biased conversions
4
PSfrag replacements
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
d
e
n
si
ty
Time
0.0
0.5
1.0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
5000
FIG. 5: The waxing and waning of the four different groups
of agents (red agents black, blue agents gray, full lines T = 1,
dashed lines T = 0) are caused by the following mechanism.
A cluster of tolerant red agents is invaded by intolerant blue
agents which convert via directed mutations to their tolerant
counterpart, giving rise to a blue cluster which is then invaded
by red intolerant agents. Although initially the number of red
and blue tolerant agents differed only by one percent a tiny
number (0.5%) of intolerant agents of each tag is enough to
generate large clusters that are segregated in time (ε = 0.01,
c = 0.1, b = 1.0).
can be analyzed in detail by considering the Poincare
map shown in Fig. 6.
At ε > 0 the fixed lines where only one tag is present
vanish. This is caused by a saddle node bifurcation [10].
A fixed line disappears at this bifurcation, and a small
channel is opened through which the system moves slowly
to the other side of the separatrix. The width of this
channel is controlled by ε. For small ε a linear depen-
dence between ε and the oscillation frequency of the at-
tractor is observed as shown in Fig. 7. Such a linear
dependence is expected in a saddle node bifurcation with
linear perturbation terms εp3 and εp4 [11].
In our model two small channels are opened by ε > 0,
as the separatrix is crossed twice in one oscillation. The
reinjection in our model is caused by the replicator dy-
namics, which drives the system to the channel of the op-
posite tag. The dependence of the oscillation frequency
on the parameter ε for c = 0.1 is shown in Fig. 7. For
values of ε > 0.02 the dynamic changes. Here the fixed
points pT+ that become stable for ε = c/2 begin to in-
fluence the dynamical system.
D. Influence of the cost of cooperation c
Here we analyze the influence of the cost of cooper-
ation c on our system by defining different measures of
order in our model and by observing the influence of c
on these measures. The donation rate is the probability
that one player donates to another, d = 〈1−p3(p2+p4)−
p4(p1 + p3)〉. The fraction of tolerant individuals can be
measured as ptol = 〈p1+p2〉 ,and the asymmetry between
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FIG. 6: The Poincare map of the p1 shows the “channel”
through which the trajectory crosses the separatrix. The
black lines are the function and the bisector. The distance
between the function and the bisector has been magnified by
a factor of 10. Therefore the course of iteration is drawn
only schematically. A marks the point where the separatrix
is crossed due to biased conversions from p3 to p1. Here p1 in-
creases further, as the fraction p4 that exploits p1 is still very
small. For ε = 0 the function and the bisector will match,
the separatrix can not longer be crossed (ε = 0.01, c = 0.1,
b = 1.0).
the tags as a = |〈p1+ p3〉− 〈p2 + p4〉|. Here 〈·〉 denotes a
time average. In addition an average over different initial
conditions is necessary.
Fig. 8 shows that these measures display changes at
c ≈ 0.02, c ≈ 0.66, c ≈ 0.73, and c ≈ 0.96. We now
discuss the reasons for these transitions. For c < ε the
points pT+ = (1 − y, y, 0) are stable fixed points. In
the case of ε < c < 2 ε only a part of this fixed line is
stable, see Appendix B for details. For c > 2 ε these
fixed points become instable, this leads to a decrease of
the asymmetry between tags at c = 2 ε
For cooperation costs c > 2 ε the typical qualitative be-
havior is described above. The attractor of such a system
can be seen in Fig. 4. For higher costs c the intolerant
players can invade earlier as their advantage is larger. In
the following we restrict ourselves to the case of ε = 0.01.
The qualitative behavior does not change until c ≈ 0.661.
The attractor for c = 0.66 can be seen in Fig. 9.
For c > 0.661 the biased conversion can no longer drive
the system through the separatrix. Two different attrac-
tors are observed for different initial conditions. In the
original model this behavior corresponds to the estab-
lishment of one cooperative cluster which becomes tol-
erant due to the truncated mutations. Intolerant indi-
viduals with the other tag try to invade, but the domi-
nant cluster becomes more intolerant again and prevents
an invasion. At c ≈ 0.73 the fixed points ps± become
5
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FIG. 7: Dependence of the oscillation frequency on the muta-
tion rate ε. The squares and the triangles are the numerical
values for c = 0.1 and c = 0.2, respectively. The line is a fit
of the frequencies for ε ≤ 0.01. For small ε the frequency in-
creases as f = αεβ. We found β = 1.0036±0.0003 for c = 0.1
and β = 1.0021 ± 0.0002 for c = 0.2. A linear dependence is
expected if the perturbation is linear in ε, as in our case. For
high values of ε the fixed line pT+ becomes partially stable
for ε = c/2 and begins to influence the system. Therefore the
frequency decreases (b = 1.0).
stable (see Appendix C). For higher values of c oscil-
lations are no longer observed. For one eigenvalue of
the corresponding Jacobi matrix Js we had |λ1| < 1
even for smaller c. In addition there is a pair of com-
plex conjugated eigenvalues that crosses the unit circle
at c ≈ 0.73. Hence we are observing a Hopf-bifurcation
here. For c > 0.73 the system spins into the fixed points
p
s±. For c ≈ 0.93 the imaginary parts of the eigenvalues
vanish. At c = 1+
√
1−16 ǫ
2 ≈ 0.96 the stable fixed points
p
s± collapse with the instable fixed point pd in a super-
critical pitchfork bifurcation. For higher values of c the
fixed point pd is stable.
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We developed a minimal model for cooperation based
on similarity. This model shows oscillations in the pop-
ulation of tolerant agents as two different groups domi-
nate the population successively. The mechanism that
drives these oscillations is a drift towards more toler-
ance. Without such a drift a cooperative cluster cannot
be destabilized and will not give way to a new coopera-
tive cluster. In other words, the temporally segregated
dynamical coexistence of different tags is only possible
if such a drift towards more tolerance exists. Without
such a drift only one species would be selected. This
is similar to the dynamical coexistence of species in the
rock-paper-scissors game [12]. The drift provides a new
mechanism for maintaining a dynamical biodiversity in
biological systems [13].
This mechanism prevents a single species from tak-
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FIG. 8: Influence of the cost c on the donation rate (squares),
the fraction of tolerant players (triangles) and the asymme-
try between the tags (diamonds). All symbols are averages
over 10 000 initial conditions and 100-10 000 time steps. The
number of time steps is taken as a uniformly distributed ran-
dom number to exclude effects resulting from changes of the
oscillation frequency. The lines are the analytical results for
c > 0.73, see Appendix C. The fraction of tolerant players
decreases as the time intervals where the tag is invaded be-
come longer. This has also an effect on the donation rate.
For c ≈ 0.66 a large change of the symmetry parameter is
observed when one symmetric attractor is replaced by two
attractors which are not symmetric. The fraction of tolerant
players and the donation rate decrease slightly at c ≈ 0.66.
The donation rate and the symmetry parameter increase un-
til the fixed points ps± become stable at c ≈ 0.73. Here
these parameters decrease again. When pd finally becomes
stable at c = 1+
√
1−16 ǫ
2
≈ 0.96 the symmetry is complete
again.(ε = 0.01, b = 1.0).
ing over the whole population as it makes the dominant
cluster vulnerable. Agents can therefore exploit the clus-
ter by accepting support without supporting the cluster.
These free-riders consequently destroy the cooperative
cluster again. The cooperative cluster can only defend
itself if the cost for cooperation is sufficiently high. In
this case the free-riders can not take over the whole pop-
ulation.
The main results do not change if the number of tags
is increased. However, the analytical treatment becomes
much more complicated, as we have to deal with n − 1
coupled nonlinear equations in the case of n tags. Yet,
a population model seems to be more appropriate in the
case of more tags, as our model shows a subsequent real-
ization of all tags in the same order.
If one analyzes a system with a spatial distribution of
agents instead of the well mixed case described above
one observes strong segregation between tags. Tolerant
players need to protect themselves against intolerant ex-
ploiters by building a border of intolerant agents around
them. The spatially distributed system and the strategies
that help to overcome the segregation will be discussed
in [14].
6
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FIG. 9: Attractor of the system (4) for c = 0.66. The black
line is the attractor. The grey points are the fixed points.
The plane is the separatrix for ε = 0. The arrows indicate the
parts of the attractor where it is mainly driven by the biased
conversions. The system does no longer cross the separatrix
near the edges p1 + p3 = 1 and p2 + p4 = 1. Near the fixed
point pd the trajectory almost closes itself. For higher values
of c there are two separated attractors ( c = 0.66, ε = 0.01,
b = 1.0).
APPENDIX A: PRISONERS DILEMMA
The introduction of “never cooperate” agents which do
not donate at all [15] instead of the zero tolerance agents
eliminates the difference between tags and leads to the
payoff matrix
(tag, T ) (red, +1) (blue, +1) (red, 0) (blue, 0)
(red, +1) b-c b-c -c -c
(blue, +1) b-c b-c -c -c
(red, 0) b b 0 0
(blue, 0) b b 0 0
which describes the prisoners dilemma [1, 8].
APPENDIX B: FIXED POINTS OF THE
REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
The stability of the fixed points with only one tag can
be calculated as follows. For pred = (1 − x, 0, x) and
ε = 0 we find the Jacobian matrix
Jred =


1 + (1− x) (c− x+ c x) 0 (c− 1) x2
c− c x 1− x c x
(1− x) (c− x+ c x) 0 1 + (c− 1) x2


(B1)
with the eigenvalues λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1−x and λ3 = 1+c−x.
The fixed point is marginal stable as long as x ≥ c, for
x < c it becomes unstable. The reasoning can be adopted
for the fixed line pblue = (0, x, 0).
A fixed point that is conserved for ε > 0 can be found
if all players are tolerant. For pT+ = (1 − y, y, 0) the
Jacobian matrix is given by
JT+ =


1 + (c y + y) y −c y y − ε 0
(c y + y) y 1− c y y − ε 0
2 y y c+ c y + ε −2 y y c− c y − ε 1 + c y − ε


(B2)
where y = 1 − y and c = 1 − c. The eigenvalues of this
matrix are λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1+cy−ε and λ3 = 1+c(1−y)−ε.
λi < 1 (i = 1, 2, 3) is not possible for ε = 0. Hence
the fixed line is instable for ε = 0. For ε > 0 there
is an interval of stability given by 1 − ε
c
< y < ε
c
. If
this inequation and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 are both fulfilled by y,
the biased conversions ensure stability of the fixed point
although the replicator dynamics alone would make this
point instable. The first inequation can only be fulfilled
for c < 2 ε. For c < ε it is always fulfilled and the whole
fixed line pT+ is stable.
The fixed point given by pd = (ε/c, ε/c, 1/2 − ε/c)
reduces to the mixed Nash equilibrium for ε = 0. The
Jacobi matrix at this fixed point is
Jd =


1 + 3 c ε+ε−c
2
2 c
−(1+c) ε
2 c
(1−c) (c−2 ε)
4 c
(1+c) ε
2 c 1 +
c ε−ε−c2
2 c
(1+c) (c−2 ε)
4 c
(1+c)ε
c
−(1+c) ε
c
1 + (1−c) (c−2 ε)2 c

 .
(B3)
The eigenvalues of this matrix are
λ1 = 1− γ
2
(B4)
λ2 = 1 +
γ(2c− 1)−
√
γ (γ + 8εc+ 8εc2)
4 c
λ3 = 1 +
γ(2c− 1) +
√
γ (γ + 8εc+ 8εc2)
4 c
,
where γ = 2ε−c. For ε = 0 we have λ1 = λ2 = 1− c2 < 1
and λ3 =
3
2 − c2 > 1. The third eigenvalue corresponds to
an instable direction. The corresponding eigenvector is
e3 = (1−c, 1+c, 2), which is the normal of the separatrix
for ε = 0. In the case of ε > 0 we have λi < 1 for
i = 1, 2, 3 only if c > 1+
√
1−16 ǫ
2 . Hence p
d becomes stable
where it coincides with the fixed points ps+ described in
appendix C. In all other cases, at least one eigenvalue of
Jd is outside the unit circle.
APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL FIXED POINTS
Numerical simulations show that the additional fixed
points for ε > 0 can always be found in the plane spanned
by (1 − c, 0, c), (0, 1 − c, 0) and (0, 0, 12 ). Together with
pt+11 = p
t
1 and p
t+1
3 = p
t
3 we have three equations that de-
scribe these points. Two of the solutions are fixed points
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not described above. The first fixed points ps+ can be
written as
p
s+ =


α+
√
αβ−2ε
2c√
αβ+2(α−ε)−
√
α2+4αβ+4α
√
αβ
2c
(1−c)(c2−β−2
√
αβ)+
√
α2+4αβ+4α
√
αβ
4α

 (C1)
where α = c(1−c) and β = α−4ε. ps− can be calculated
by exchanging p1 with p2 and p3 with p4 = 1−p1−p2−p3.
These fixed points have only real coordinates for β ≥ 0.
For β = 0 we have ps+ = ps− = pd.
The eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix at the fixed points
p
s± can be calculated numerically. For ε = 0.01 the fixed
points are only stable if c > 0.73. At c = 1+
√
1−16 ǫ
2 ≈
0.96 they collapse with pd in a supercritical pitchfork
bifurcation and form a single stable fixed point .
For c > 0.73 the fixed points ps± are the only stable
attractors and the order measures described in Section
IIID can be calculated analytically. We find for c < 0.96
d = 1− p3(p2 + p4)− p4(p1 + p3) (C2)
=
5α− 4ε(1 + c) + 2√αβ −
√
α2 + 4αβ + 4α
√
αβ
4α
ptol = p1 + p2 (C3)
=
3α− 4ε+ 2√αβ −
√
α2 + 4αβ + 4α
√
αβ
2c
a = |p1 + p3 − p2 − p4| (C4)
=
−α+
√
α2 + 4αβ + 4α
√
αβ
2α
.
For c > 0.96 the fixed point pd becomes stable and we
find d = 12 +
ε
c
, ptol = 2
ε
c
and a = 0.
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